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Organizational Representation Suits:
Labor Unions May Attack Employment Discrimination
Without Having to Meet Rule 23 Requirements
In recent years, unions have begun to undertake prosecution of employ-
ment discrimination suits as class actions. However, a major obstacle en-
countered by labor unions in attempting to serve as class representative for
those members alleged to be victims of employment discrimination is their
failure to qualify under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The
inability adequately to protect the competing interests of class members has
proven to be the most frequently fatal element halting the union from being
certified as the class representative under rule 23.2
In the recent case of Local 194, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union v. Standard Brands, Inc.,5 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, devised a method which will allow labor unions standing to sue under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 without first meeting the re-
quirements of Rule 23. Basing its opinion upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Warth v. Seldin,5 the Seventh Circuit held that labor unions have standing
'Rule 23(a) specifies four criteria which must be satisfied before either the suit may be cer-
tified as a class action or the plaintiff filing suit may be certified as the class representative:
(1) The class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
(2) There must be questions of law or fact common to the class.
(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims and
defenses of the class.
(4) The representative parties must fairly and adequately protet the interests of the class.
Specifically, under rule 23(a)(4), a class representative must "fairly and adequately protect
the interest of the class." Without this requirement, an unrepresentative plaintiff could obtain
class action certification, proceed to trial on the merits, obtain an inadequate result and bind, by
res judicata, the unnamed class members. In short, the class members would be unprotected.
2See, e.g., Social Serv. Union v. County of Santa Clara, 12 F.E.P. Cases 570 (N.D. Cal.
1975); Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d
636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); State ex rel. Overton v. New Mexico State
Tax Comm'n, 81 N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613, 617 (1970); Associated Orchestra Leaders v. Phila-
delphia Musical Soc'y, Local 77, 203 F. Supp. 755, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
3540 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter referred to as Local 194].
442 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
5422 U.S. 490 (1975). Plaintiffs in Warth consisted of eight individual low-income minority
members who sought housing in Penfield, N.Y., a suburb of Rochester. Other plaintiffs included
Metro-Act, a non-profit corporation primarily involved in efforts to alleviate the housing shortage
for low and moderate income persons, and various housing developers who had attempted to ob-
tain a variance to rezone certain land to allow construction of subsidized cooperative housing
units that could be purchased by persons of moderate income.
The Penfield community had a land-use ordinance which allocated ninety-eight percent of
the town's vacant land to single-family detached housing. Only three-tenths of one percent of the
land available for residential construction was zoned for multi-family dwellings.
Plaintiffs brought a class action in the federal court for the Western District of New York
challenging Penfield's ordinance and its administration during a fifteen year period by the zoning
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to file employment discrimination suits on behalf of those members alleged to
be victims of discrimination, who are willing to be represented by the union.
The union's standing is based on an organizational representation theory
rather than a more rigid class action theory.6
Although under this approach labor unions can be granted standing to
sue only for injunctive and declaratory relief for their members, this still
allows unions to continue to take an active role in attacking Title VII viola-
tions. At present, unions which are adjudged to be inadequate class repre-
sentatives because of their members' conflicting interests are relieved of a ma-
jor portion of the responsibility to pursue actively their members' statutory
claims under Title VII.7 The decision in Local 194 has the effect of placing
the responsibility back onto the union to pursue both contractual and
statutory claims of discrimination, albeit in a more limited capacity.
Before Local 194 is accepted as a panacea to the unions' problems of
representing their members, some crucial questions need to be asked. The
decision brings into question whether organizational representation suits
and planning boards and the city council as "racially discriminatory and exclusionary." In sup-
port of this allegation, they claimed that they searched for housing in Penfield but were excluded
due to defendant's policies and practices and were therefore injured, having been forced to live
in a community with inferior housing and schools, reduced job opportunities and increased ex-
pense and inconvenience in commuting long distances to work.
The district court dismissed the complaint stating that plaintiffs lacked the requisite
standing and had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court on the sole ground that the plaintiffs lacked
standing. The Supreme Court ruled that the non-resident, low-income minority plaintiffs lacked
standing. As to the various associations, the Court ruled that although associations may have
standing to sue for injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of their members, in this case, no
allegations pertaining to the viability of the project at the time the complaint was filed, nor any
allegations referring to obstruction of a then-current project. For a discussion of Warth, see
Blum, The New Criteria For Standing in Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 11 SUFFoLK U.L. R.v. 1
(1976).
'See note 3 supra.
'The union is bound to pursue charges of employment discrimination which arise out of
the members' contractual right under the collective-bargaining agreement. "In submitting his
grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual rights under a collective
bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts in-
dependent statutory rights accorded by Congress." Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415 U.S.
49-50 (1974).
There is an important distinction to be made between a grievance complaint
and a Title VII claim: the former is a contractual claim subject to the grievance
machinery of a collective bargain, while the latter is a statutory claim completely in-
dependent of the grievance-arbitration procedures of a collective bargain contract.
Although an employment practice forbidden by Title VII may be treated as an unfair
labor practice and aired through contractual procedures, if it is brought to arbitra-
tion, and the claim of discrimination is ultimately rejected by the arbitrator, the ar-
bitrator's resolution of the contractual right to be free from discrimination is not
dispositive of the statutory right to be free from discrimination. . . . It is clear
(however] that a union's status as a certified collective bargaining agent gives it no
special role to play in Title VII disputes.
See Note, Title VII-Cla= Actions-Adequacy. of Representation-Stewards v. American
Airlines, Inc., 15 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. Rxv. 1332 (1974).
[Vol. 53:113
1977-1978] ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATION SUITS 115
undercut what appears to be a clear preference by Congress for the filing of
class actions to attack employment discrimination.8 Also, consideration needs
to be given to the effect of organizational representation suits upon the duty
of fair representation,9 especially since they can place unions on one side of a
conflict involving various factions of their members. Finally, some analysis of
the substantive differences between organizational representation suits and
class actions should be explored.
The purpose of-this note is to examine the characteristics and ramifica-
tions of allowing labor unions to file employment discrimination suits under
Title VII using an organizational representation approach. This will include
a survey of the history of associational standing to sue; an examination into
the issue of whether organizational suits circumvent congressional preference
for using class actions to rectify cases of employment discrimination; and an
attempt to articulate some existing guidelines set for unions which sue on
behalf of their members in the future.
HISTORY OF ASSOCIATIONS' STANDING TO SUE
The disputes surrounding the question of associations' ability to be sued
and to sue on behalf of their members culminated after years of uncertainty10
$See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra.
9Under this doctrine, the union, as the exclusive bargaining agent of its members, has a
statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination
toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid ar-
bitrary conduct. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Steele v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
The doctrine of fair representation was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Steele v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). This was a suit by black railroad employees against
their union to enjoin implementation of a union-negotiated agreement, the provisions of which
restricted hiring and tenure opportunities for blacks as locomotive firemen. The Court ruled that
because § 2(4) of the Railway Labor Act explicitly empowered a union elected by a majority of
the employees to exclusively represent them in all collective bargaining agreements, the hostility
displayed by the union toward black employees clearly breached this statutorily-
implied duty. Note, Fair Representation and Breach of Contract in Section 301 Employee-Union
Suits: Who's Watching the Back Door?, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 714, 724 (1974).
While the duty of fair representation affords important protection for worker interests,
it must be noted that its protection is neither all-embracing nor all-powerful. It is not
all embracing because the duty does not ordinarily extend to union conduct unrelated
to the negotiation or administration of a collective bargaining agreement. It is hardly
all powerful, even within its proper domain, because it accords a union extraordinarily
broad discretion in the discharge of its representation function.
Id. at 725-26.
"At common law, an unincorporated association of persons was not recognized as having
any other character than a partnership in whatever was done, and it could only sue or be sued in
the names of its members, and their liability had to be enforced against each member. See
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572 (1906); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers
Local Union, 165 Ind. 421 (1905); Baskins v. UMW, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921).
In the case of UMW v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922), the Supreme Court ruled that
unincorporated labor unions, such as the United Mine Workers of America, and its district, and
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in the case of National Motor Freight Traffic Association, Inc. v. United
States. "1 In National Motor Freight, the lower court had held that the plain-
tiffs, motor carrier associations whose members were affected by an ICC deci-
sion which they wished to challenge, lacked standing to represent their
members' interests. 12 Although it affirmed the lower court on the merits, the
Supreme Court held that the associations were "proper representatives of the
interests of their members." i s Over the next decade, numerous types of
organizations were able to establish standing to sue on behalf of their
members.' 4 This was particularly true of environmental groups,' 5 civil rights
groups,' 6 property owner associations,' 7 and public employee unions. 18
The most significant broadening 9 of the requirements for associations to
meet the criteria for federal standing occurred in the case of Warth v.
Seldin.20 In the final section of his opinion, Justice Powell addressed the peti-
tioner associations' standing to sue. He held that an association can have
standing to sue either in its own right or as the representative of its
local branches were recognized as distinct entities by numerous acts of Congress, as well as by the
laws and decisions of many states, and are suable as such in the federal courts.
For organizational representation suits, the distinction between the incorporated and unin-
corporated organizations is now primarily of historical significance. The current case law does
not distinguish between incorporated and unincorporated organizations.
1372 U.S. 246 (1963). Subsequent cases which have recognized organizational representa-
tion theories inlude: Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Lodge 1858, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Paine, 436 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Curran v. Land, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Wat-
son, 409 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 596 U.S. 902 (1969).
12205 F. Supp. 592, 595-94 (D.D.C. 1962).
1"572 U.S. at 247 (1965).
14See, e.g., National Tenants Organization, Inc. v. HUD, 558 F. Supp. 512 (D.D.C. 1973);
Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 455 (1971). See
Note, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Members' Claims,
1974 U. ILL. L.F. 665.
'sSee, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669 (1973); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460, 465 n.2 (9th Cir. 1973). cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1052 (1974); Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
"See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 595 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968); ACLU v. Albert Gallatin Area School Dist., 507 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
"
7See, e.g., Save Sand Key, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 281 So.2d 572, 575-77 (Fla. App.
1975); White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 271-74, 177
N.W.2d 475, 476-78 (1970); Douglaston Civil Ass'n v. Gavin, 69 Misc. 2d 686, 330 N.Y.S.2d 810
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
"See, e.g., Council 34 AFSCME v. Ogilvie, 465 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972); United Fed'n of
Postal Clerks v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Smith v. Board of Educ., 3565 F.2d 770
(8th Cir. 1966); California Fed'n of Teachers v. Oxnard Elementary Schools, 272 Cal. App. 2d
514, 77 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1969).
"The opinion in Warth is considered "broadening" because of its clarification of the cir-
cumstances under which associations may either represent itself or its members in an action to
protect their rights. Prior to this opinion, there existed some uncertainty as to the scope of
associations standing to sue on behalf of its members.
2422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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members. 21 The association, however, must allege concrete injury to itself or
to one or more members. 22 The Warth decision formed the basis for the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Local 194.
Local 194
Local 194 involved a union and certain other named plaintiffs who filed
suit under Title V11 23 and section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 186624
against Standard Brands, Inc. The plaintiffs sued both on their own behalf
and as representatives of a class consisting of all blacks, Spanish-surnamed
persons and women against whom defendant had allegedly practiced
discrimination in hiring and promotion. 25 The district court dismissed the
union as plaintiff based upon its failure "to allege sufficient injury in fact to
confer standing pursuant to either Title VII or Sec. 1981. ''26
In overruling the district court's dismissal of the union's action, the court
of appeals relied primarily upon the holding in Warth v. Seldin.27 In Warth,
the Supreme Court stated that an organization, even though it has suffered
no injury to itself, has standing to represent any of its members who are "suf-
fering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of
the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves
brought suit.128
The Supreme Court qualified the organization's standing to sue by stating
that the organization may only seek injunctive and declaratory relief on
behalf of its members. An organization which has suffered "no monetary in-
jury to itself, nor [received] any assignment of the damages claims of its
members" cannot recover damages for individual members. When damage
claims are not "common to the entire membership, nor shared by all in equal
degrees, but are peculiar to the individual member concerned, each member
"Citing National Motor Freight. See note 11 supra.
22See Note, Federal Standing: 1976 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 383, 402 (1976), citing Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490.
2342 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to -17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
1142 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
The basis for standing to bring a Title VII (1964 Act) action is different from
that applying to an 1866 Act suit. The 1964 statute specifically permits only an "ag-
grieved" person to bring a court action. The 1866 Act (42 U.S.C. § 1981) has no such
specific provision. Under that statute, standing to sue derives from the Federal Rule 23
which requires the party bringing a class action to suffer an injury "typical" of that
suffered by the other members of the class it seeks to represent. In practice, courts
have applied the same standing rules to both, statutes equating the requirement to be
"aggrieved" under Title VII with the necessary "injury" under the 1866 Act.
Reply Brief of Appellee at 9, 10, Local 194 v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864 (7th Cir.
1976); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 10 E.P.D. 5944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
25540 F.2d 864, 865 (7th Cir. 1976).
"
5Local 194 v. Standard Brands, Inc., 15 F.E.P. Cases 497, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
27422 U.S. 490 (1975).
281d. at 511 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972)).
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who claims damages must be a party to the suit, and the organization lacks
standing to claim damages on his behalf. " 29
The defendant in Local 194 had argued that the union members had
conflicting interests and therefore the union could not represent any of them.
In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals emphasized that this was not
a new problem for unions and that not all union members would be bound
by the suit. 0 "Often a union finds itself in the position of representing a
membership whose interests conflict, not only in Title VII cases, but in its
collective bargaining role. This does not disqualify it from acting at all."3'
The union's duty "is to represent fairly the interests of all members without
discrimination toward any."3
2
Title VII [however], unlike the National Labor Relations Act, does not create
nor necessarily recognize powers of exclusive representation,3 3 . . . and in-
dividual union members may elect not to have the union represent them.
The union has standing, however, to represent those employees who wish to
be represented but do not elect to become parties to the action.34
The second issue decided by the court of appeals dealt with the question
of whether a union representing its members in a Title VII action must
satisfy any of the prerequisites required by rule 23 for certification of a suit as
a class action. In deciding the issue, the court of appeals again relied upon
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin.3 6 In Warth, the
Supreme Court reasoned that, absent injury to itself, the association does not
have standing to bring actions to recover damages for individualized injuries
to its members. Therefore, because "both the fact and extent of injury would
require individualized prodf," the Supreme Court ruled that "each member
... who claims injury as a result of the respondents' practices must be a party
to the suit. 3 6
With the "individualized proof' as the pivotal concern, the court of ap-
peals reasoned that neither rule 23(b)(1) nor rule 23(b)(2) could apply under
an organizational representation theory as neither allows the class members to
opt out of the suit to pursue individual remedies. Such opting out was re-
quired to avoid binding members with conflicting interests. Although rule
23(b)(3) allows members to opt out, the court of appeals implied that the fac-
tors considered under this section would render a class action inappropriate
29ld. at 515-16.
30540 F.2d at 866-67.
31 d. (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964)).
3 21d. (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
"
3Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d
636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 993 [hereinafter referred to as Stewards].34Local 194, 540 F.2d at 866.
s5422 U.S. 490 (1975).
"
6Id. at 515-16.
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when the union acted as the class representative.3 7 This is true primarily
because of the union's continued inability to represent adequately the com-
peting interests of the class members.
Finally, the court of appeals reasoned that if rule 25 governed organiza-
tional representation suits, the Supreme Court in Warth could have stated
this to be the case, rather than merely citing the rule as being analogous.
3 8
Further, the Supreme "Court's remarks plainly imply that the organization's
members are not parties to an organization representation suit. Yet class
members are parties to class actions.139 From this analysis, the court of ap-
peals concluded from Warth "that organizational representation suits need
not be brought as class actions, and that the requirements of Rule 23 are ap-
plicable only by analogy and only to .the extent they are consistent with
Warth v. Seldin.40
In an earlier decision, Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses, Local 550 v.
American Airlines, Inc.,41 the Seventh Circuit ruled that a union attempting
to represent the interests of different factions of its membership whose in-
terests were antagonistic would be an inadequate class representative in a
class action. Although Local 194 had the effect of superceding the opinion in
Stewards on the issue of whether rule 23 criteria must be met in actions
under Title VII, the two cases taken together form a more complete picture
of the parameters of actions to be filed under Title VII. Before making any
substantive distinction between the two cases, an examination will be made of
the Seventh Circuit's handling of Stewards.
Stewards
Defendant airlines until October 1970 followed the practice of per-
manently discharging any stewardess who became pregnant. The Airline
Stewards and Stewardesses Association (ALSSA) and twelve stewardesses who
had lost their jobs under this policy commenced an action against American
3"Local 194, 540 F.2d at 866.
"In the nature of things, an organization suing solely as a representative of one or
more of its members would be unable to meet all the requirements of Rule 23, if those
requirements were read literally. It is not a member of the class of persons whose
rights are to be vindicated, and inasmuch as it can even sue on behalf of a single
member, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511, the standard of numerosity, Rule 23(a)(1)
is not apt. The same is true of the common-question and typicality standards, Rule
25(a)(2) and (3), when the organization represents a single member, and, if more are
represented, these matters are best controlled by joinder rules. In short, although Rule
23 may provide a useful analogy in some cases in which an organization represents its
members, it is not controlling. We therefore need not apply without qualification the
body of law that has developed under the adequate-representation standard of Rule
23(a)(4).
540 F.2d at 867.
"'Id. at 867. See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
10540 F.2d at 867.
4"Stewards, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
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Airlines challenging this practice of unlawful sex discrimination as a violation
of Title VII. The complaint asserted that the action was within rule 23(b)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the class consisted of all pre-
sent and former American Airlines stewardesses employed at any time since
July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "who had
been, desired to be, or would in the future desire to be pregnant. '42 The
complaint sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief.
In attempting to reach a settlement with American Airlines, the union
encountered numerous conflicts between the interests of presently employed
stewardesses and former stewardesses who had lost their jobs under the
"discharge-for-pregnancy" policy. Problems arose particularly in the area of
seniority, where currently unemployed stewardesses were asking for seniority
accrued from the date of their illegal dismissal and immediate reinstatement.
Also, because the airline was unwilling to negotiate concerning backpay for
the reinstated stewardesses, an issue arose as to whether a settlement which
would avert a possible five-year court battle, but which would greatly com-
promise the complaints3 of both factions of the membership, would be in the
best interest of either faction.
The inability of the union to resolve the conflicting interests of both fac-
tions of the membership made the application of policies underlying rule 23
the pivotal concern in Stewards. Because the complaint filed by plaintiffs in
this case asserted that the action was within rule 23(b)(2), it had the effect of
not allowing any of the plaintiffs individually to opt out of the action.
Without the ability to opt out, individual stewardesses would be bound by
any settlement which the union made, regardless of their dissatisfaction with
the terms of the settlement. Upon settlement of the claim, the district court
ruled that the union and the named plaintiffs were adequate representatives
of the class, and that in spite of objections by some of the individual plain-
tiffs, the action was a rule 23(b)(2) class action and was binding on all
members of the class. 44
Before deciding which section of rule 23 applied, the court of appeals
first dealt with the distinction between the degree of duty placed upon the
union under the Railway Labor Act45 and under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.46 The court ruled that "except for the area of collective bargain-
4 ld. at 638.
4'Although both discharged and presently employed stewardesses were seeking the disconti-
nuance of the "discharge-for-pregnancy" policy, most of the discharged stewardesses were also
seeking immediate reinstatement, backpay, seniority accrued from the date of their illegal
dismissal, and other personal damages which may have accrued from their illegal dismissal. Since
the presently employed stewardesses had not yet been affected by the policy, none of them had
any damages. Therefore, discharged stewardesses stood to lose much more than presently-
employed stewardesses in any type of settlement which included a compromise of interests by the
union.
44490 F.2d 636, 642 (1973).
45Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
4642 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to -17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
[Vol. 53:112
1977-1978] ORGANIZATIOVAL REPRESENTATION SUITS 121
ing and its necessary incidents," where under the Railway Labor Act unions
have the powers of exclusive representation,
47
the union has no unique authority to compromise the rights of its members.
Its adequacy as a representative party in a class suit, and its authority to
compromise the rights of its members in a class suit when such rights do not
arise out of collective bargaining agreements are to be tested and judged in
the ordinary way.
4
"
Upon deciding that the union would be treated as any other class repre-
sentative, the court then weighed the appropriateness of applying rule
23(b)(3) rather than rule 23(b)(2) as the lower court had done. In applying
the differing interests of the class members under either (b)(2) or (b)(3), the
court ruled that "[a]s to the discharged stewardesses, the class action would,
even at the beginning have had to be maintained under (b)(3), with each
stewardess having the right to exclude herself, or appear through counsel." 4
The logic of this rationale is indicated by the fact that rule 23(b)(2) applied
to class actions in which "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole."50 The discharged stewardesses sought more than just "final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief." They sought reinstate-
ment, retroactive seniority, backpay and individual monetary damages which
had accrued. Rule 23(b)(2) would also not have allowed dissatisfied
stewardesses to opt out of the suit.5 1 Therefore, it appears that rule 23(b)(3)
would have been the most appropriate class action theory under which to
4745 U.S.C. j§ 151-188 (1970).
"Stewards, 490 F.2d at 642.
"Id. at 643.
501d. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)).
5lUnder rule 23(c)(1), the court is given discretion to alter or amend the action as it deems
necessary. However, it is doubtful that most courts would allow large numbers of potential plain-
tiffs to opt out of an action, especially if it is pleaded as a (b)(2) class action. Using subclasses
would be one limited alternative for dealing with some of the conflicts which would arise in an
action such as Stewards. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the appropriateness of
courts allowing opting-out in rule 23(b)(2) class actions, most courts have accepted the conclusion
of Professor Moore that "members of the class in an action under (b)(1) or (b)(2) have no
privilege of opting-out." 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.60 (2d ed. 1977). However, some
courts have permitted members of a rule 23(b)(2) class to withdraw from the action. See, e.g.,
Walker v. Styrex Indus., 15 F.E.P. Cases 274 (M.D.N.C. 1976); Osta Powicz v. Johnson Bronze
Co., 369 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Pa. 1972), affd in part, vacated in part, 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.
1976) (class action treatment accepted); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305,
1306 (E.D. La. 1969).
In the recent case of Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977) the court
of appeals allowed the district court's order permitting "opting-out" in a rule 23(b)(2) based on
the following construction of the lower court's order: (1) Class members are permitted but not re-
quired to respond to the class notice; (2) Nonresponding class members will not be excluded from
the class; (3) Nonresponses will not be used to determine that the numerosity requirement has
not been met. Id. at 660.
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allow the suit to proceed. 52 In a (b)(3) class action, the discharged
stewardesses could opt out of the suit and pursue their individual damage
remedies of backpay and seniority.
Comparison of Local 194 and Stewards
At first glance, Local 194 appears to be a reversal of Stewards. The basic
issues in the two cases are similar, but may be distinguished in two critical
areas. The first is that Stewards was handled as a class action under rule 23
and Local 194 was adjudicated as an organizational representation suit. The
second is that Stewards was a case of a union representing two major factions
of its membership with conflicting interests which proved to be fatal to the
union's ability to represent the class. In Local 194, the court circumvented
the conflicting interests by allowing the union to represent only those
members who were willing to be represented by the union. Upon closer
analysis of the decisions in Local 194 and Stewards, the question arises as to
whether substantial differences exist between the class action and organiza-
tional representation approaches. Although Local 194 allows the union to get
around rule 23 requirements, the question still remains as to what effect
organizational representation suits will have in dealing with the conflicting in-
terests of the union members.
Using the facts of Stewards as an example, an examination of the
organizational representation approach can be made. In Stewards, the major
issue common to both present and discharged stewardesses involved the
"discharge-for-pregnancy" policy. The one major area of conflict between the
two factions centered around the issues of seniority and immediate rehiring.
As the discharged stewardesses sought retroactive seniority from the dates of
their illegal discharge, the practical effect would be for the discharged
stewardesses to "bump" many of the present stewardesses out of jobs due to
their lack of seniority.
If the union in Stewards had been able to pursue the action as an organ-
izational representation suit, this still would not have resolved the conflict
between the stewardesses' interests. Whether the union represented the
discharged stewardesses or the presently employed stewardesses, the conflict
between the interests of the two groups would have remained. Discharged
stewardesses would still not be able to be rehired immediately, with accrued
seniority, without "bumping" the presently employed stewardesses who had
accumulated less seniority.
With this analysis in mind, the conclusion can be drawn that the decision
in Local 194 is but a procedural modification. The decision to allow
'Rule 23(c)(4) allows, "when appropriate: (A) an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and
each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and ap-
plied accordingly."
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organizational representation suits does not deal with the substantive problem
underlying rule 23, namely the representation of a class of plaintiffs with con-
flicting interests. Rather, organizational representation suits appear to be only
a procedural maneuver for allowing the union to continue to take an active
role in attacking discriminatory activities of the employer.
STATE OF TITLE VII ACTIONS AFTER LOCAL 194
Although the organizational representation approach in Local 194 can be
characterized as merely a procedural mechanism, it does provide an alterna-
tive for unions which may be apprehensive about their ability to satisfy rule
23 requirements. In combining Local 194 and Stewards with the prevailing
case law in the area, certain guidelines regarding union representation under
Title VII may be drawn:
(A) A union may have standing to sue under Title VII and section 1981
if it has either suffered injury under the Act or is asserting the rights of its
membership. 53 However, a union, absent injury to the organization itself, has
standing to sue on behalf of its membership only insofar as injunctive and
declaratory relief is concerned.54
(B) Unlike collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act and the
National Labor Relations Act wherein the union has exclusive powers of
representation, the union under a Title VII action has no unique authority to
compromise the rights of its members who are victims of discrimination."'
However, a union's representation, in collective bargaining, of its member
whose interests conflict does not deprive it of standing to sue the employer on
behalf of willing members for alleged discrimination simply because of the
conflict in the members' interests. 56 And a union that sues the employer
under Title VII and section 1981 on behalf of the members does not have to
meet the requirements of rule 23, but may instead treat the action as an
organizational representation suit wherein the union litigates the case on
behalf of its willing members who are alleged victims of discrimination.
However, the union's representation of the interests of the discriminatees must
be done in light of its duty of fair representation to all of its members.5 7
"SLocal 194, 540 F.2d at 865.
941d.
56Id. at 866; Stewards, 490 F.2d at 641.
"Local 194, 540 F.2d at 866.
'
71d. at 867-68. It is still unclear how the union will balance its representation of one fac-
tion of its members under an organizational representation theory while at the same time fulfill
its duty of fair representation to the other faction of its members with conflicting interests. One
apparent answer is that so long as the union exercises its discretion with "complete good faith
and honesty" and attempts "to represent fairly the interests of all members without discrimina-
tion toward any," neither faction will be able to successfully assert that the union has breached
its duty to them. Needles to say, this represents a very broad standard and allows the union great
discretion.
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(C) A union suing under Title VII and section 1981 under a class action
theory will have its adequacy as a representative party tested under the same
requirements of rule 23 as would any ordinary class representative.
5 8
(D) A union suing under Title VII and section 1981 under an organiza-
tional representation theory is required to give notice of its representation to
all of its members, and any member claiming to be a victim of discrimination
who chooses not to be represented by the union may either opt out of the
litigation or make an appearance.5 9
The above set of guidelines does not purport to be exhaustive. Rather, it
represents an assimilation of the major points decided in Local 194 and
Stewards into the present case law in this area.
Intent of Congress
The holding of Local 194 raises a number of questions about the viability
of organizational representation suits in combating large scale employment
discrimination under Tite VII. One question which needs examination is
whether organizational representation suits undercut congressional intent in
passing Title VII. Upon examining the legislative history of Title VII and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,60 it becomes clear that although
Congress intended to protect individual rights to redress and remedy, there is
a strong preference for the adjudication of employment discrimination cases
through class action suits. 61 In the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Senate-
House Conference Committee considering the 1972 Amendment to Title VII,
the class action preference was noted:
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and
not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be handled
through the offices of the EEOC or the Attorney General, as appropriate.
However . . . .
[i]n establishing the enforcement provisions under this subsection and subsec-
tion 706(f) generally, it is not intended that any of the provisions contained
therein shall affect the present use of class action lawsuits under Title VII in
conjunction with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The courts
have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims under Title VII in-
volve the vindication of a major public interest, and that any actions under
the Act involves considerations beyond those raised by the individual clai-
mant. As a consequence, the leading cases in this area to date have recognized
that many Title VII claims are necessarily class action complaints and that
accordingly, it is not necessary that each individual entitled to relief be nam-
ed in the original charge or in the claim for relief. A provision limiting class
"Stewards 490 F.2d at 642.
"Local 194, 540 F.2d at 865.
6042 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to -17 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975).
"1The remaining question is who may initiate such a suit. See Petition and Suggestion By
Petitioner For Reheaing in Banc at 2, Local 194, 540 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1976).
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actions was contained in the House bill and specifically rejected by the Con-
ference Committee.6 2
Considering the apparent class action preference of Congress, an ex-
amination of the resolution of Local 194 reveals some erosion of the class ac-
tion preference. Under the organizational representation approach, because
unions may only represent those members who are willing to be represented,
large factions of alleged discriminatees could potentially be left to make court
appearances through individual representation. Further, those who choose not
to be represented by the union may have differing interests from the class
represented by the union.
In probing the question of whether organizational representation suits
under Title VII undercut congressional intent, some of the policies underly-
ing the class action preference should be examined. These policies include:
(a) decreasing the multiplicity of individual suits which could emerge from
one wrongful act, thus decreasing the number of repetitive cases on court
dockets; (b) protecting individual members of the class from inconsistent and
varying adjudications while also protecting the interests and rights of the par-
ty opposing the class; (c) alleviating some of the financial burden on in-
dividuals who must litigate their individual cases through the court system;
and (d) vindicating major public interests (e.g., protection against discrimina-
tion based on race, sex, religion or national origin).
A significant switch to organizational representation suits to protect Title
VII rights would have a definite effect upon the above policies. This switch
would have the greatest adverse impact in the area of judicial economy. If,
for instance, union members who opt out of being represented by the union
pursue their actions individually, and non-union members with similar causes
of action pursue their remedies individually, there will certainly be an in-
crease in the number of cases on court dockets. Therefore, to offset these in-
creases in litigation, the courts must either exercise their ability to join cases
more frequently, attempt to settle as many issue in prior cases as possible or
devise some other method for dealing with the increase.
6
3
Nonetheless, a rational analysis of Local 194 would probably discount
any great shift to organizational representation suits. First, because of the
courts' tendency to certify the majority of class actions filed under Title VII,
there does not appear to be a great need to resort to organizational represen-
tation suits.64 Second, because Title VII encourages reconciliation and settle-
2118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF P.L. 92-261, at 1847
(1972).
"Although this not does not attempt to deal with the issue of res judicata, the res judicata
effects of organizational representation suits will certainly affect the degree to which congres-
sional policies underlying class actions will be eroded by this type of representation.
"6General agreement exists among commentators that the courts have been quite liberal in
applying the rule 23 strictures on class actions filed under Title VII. See generally 3 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10-1 (2d ed. 1974); 7 C. Wmutrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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ment, most parties are willing to resolve their claims as judiciously and ex-
peditiously as possible without having to pursue their remedies through the
courts. Third, because of the costs involved with litigating a case through the
appellate process, most parties would prefer to have their claims either settled
in a class action or joined with as many other plaintiffs as possible. In this
way, expenses may be spread over a larger group of parties.
For these reasons, it is doubtful that the use of organizational representa-
tion suits will greatly undercut congressional preference for the use of class
actions to pursue Title VII violations. Particularly since the court in Local
194 devised this remedy as analogous to a rule 23 class action, most of the
policies of rule 23 will be preserved.
The significant role played by labor unions in contemporary American
society justifies any erosive effect the decision in Local 194 may have on the
policies behind the congressional preference for class actions. Because of the
large number of workers who are represented by unions and because of the
crucial interests they were organized to protect, denying unions the ability to
represent any of their members because some of them have conflicting in-
terests would create an anomolous result. It is difficult to imagine Congress
placing such a heavy burden of fair representation upon unions through the
Labor Management Relations Act6 5 and the Railway Labor Act,66 while con-
versely permitting the total exclusion of unions when their members have con-
flicting interests. During the institution of an employment discrimination ac-
tion, union members are in the greatest need of the financial backing and ex-
pertise of their union. Without the union's representation, the union
members lose one of their most powerful advocates. Although the union will
not be able to represent adequately the interests of some of its members, due
PRocEDuRE § 1771, at 662-63 (1972); Comment, Class Actions and Title VII of the Civil Rights
of 1964: The Proper Class Representative and the Class Remedy, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1005, 1006-11
(1973). This liberality is primarily a function of the remedial nature of Title VII and the
undeniable fact that employment discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic is by defini-
tion suited to class action treatment. It is recognized that the class action device, with its binding
res judicata effect on all members is an efficient and powerful mechanism for redress of
grievances when properly utilized and not abused. See Note, The Class Action and Title
VII-An Overview, 10 U. RIcH. L. REv. 325 (1976).
It could be said that Title VII actions are, by their very nature, class actions. Bowe v. Col-
gate Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969), typifies this view. On the class action aspects of the
case, the court stated: "A suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class action as the evil
sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic, i.e., race, sex, religion
or national origin." Id. at 719. However, the view that Title VII cases are necessarily class ac-
tions has been specifically refuted in a number of cases. E.g., Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,
472 F.3d 631, 653 (1972). For example, in Gresham v. Ford Motor Co., 53 F.R.D. 105 (D.C.
Ga. 1970), the court stated that the premise that every civil action for racial discrimination in
employment states a case for treatment as a class action "is unacceptable on a legal level. ...
[and] is also unacceptable on the level of equity." The court explained: "[I]t is patently unfair to
the company to require it to list, explain and defend every refusal to hire, failure to promote,
disciplinary action and termination of every applicant or employee . . ." Id. at 107.
6529 U.S.C. § 141-151 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975).
6645 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1970).
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to the conflicting interests which may arise among the membership, as long
as a good faith effort is made to do what is in the best interest of all of its
members, it has not breached its duty of fair representation.
The decision in Local 194 serves another function in that organizational
representation suits insure the presence of the union in the litigation in spite
of conflicts which may arise. To allow the union to remain dormant because
certain factions of its membership have conflicting interests will carve an un-
necessary loophole into the union's duty to represent fairly and adequately the
interests of its membership. If for no other reason than to close this loophole,
Local 194 is a contribution to labor law.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Local 194 represents a deviation from the traditional
class actions which have been instituted to attack employment discrimination
under Title VII. Although the legislative history of Title VII shows a clear
congressional preference for class actions to combat employment discrimina-
tion, the availability of organizational representation suits does not severely
undercut the policies underlying class actions. In fact, organizational repre-
sentation suits appear to be only a procedural deviation rather than a
mechanism for dealing with the more substantive problem of how a union
may adequately represent a class of plaintiffs with conflicting interests.6 7
Local 194 appears to be only a procedural maneuver for allowing the union
to continue to take an active role in attacking discriminatory activities of the
employer, in spite of conflicts which may arise among the interests of the
union members.
The decision in Local 194 should not, however, be underrated. To deny
unions the ability to defend the statutory rights of any of its membership
because some of them have competing interests is to eliminate the union at a
time when the membership most needs its financial backing and expertise in
dealing with labor disputes. Also, to allow the union to remain dormant at a
time of strife between its membership and the employer is to allow the union
to exercise a loophole which is anomolous to the heavy duty placed upon
labor organizations through the Labor Management Relations Act. Local 194
has, at least, closed this loophole.
RICHARD J. EPPs, JR.
"
7 The court of appeals solution in Local 194 appears to be the most satisfactory manner for
dealing with the conflicts presented in this case. An alternative would be to allow the union to
compromise and settle both contractual and statutory rights of its members when violations of
these rights may be directly traced to the employee's job. Although this alternative would be con-
trary to the congressional policy of providing Title VII statutory rights as a mechanism for in-
dividual redress of grievances, a countervailing consideration is the availability of an action for
breach of the duty of fair representation which would be available if the union failed adequately
to represent the interest of an individual. To give effect to this alternative, however, the court
would have to hold the union to an even higher standard in the duty of protecting statutory
rights of the union members than it requires in the case of contractural rights. - .

